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A Self-Refuting Argument Against Jackson
Katalin Balog takes on the task of refuting Frank Jackson’s Conceivability Argument against physicalism as an explanation
of the mind-body problem. For Balog, the Conceivability Argument contains two main points. The first claim of the Conceivability
Argument is that “phenomenal consciousness is not identical to, realized by, or supervenient on physical properties”
(Balog 1999, 497). The second claim is that an explanatory gap exists between phenomenal and physical levels of description.
What the Conceivability Argument is saying, in the view of Balog, is that our phenomenal experiences cannot be explained solely
in terms of the physical world. The nomenclature of physics alone is not enough for us to be able to communicate the nature
of, and the sensations of, our phenomenal experiences. Rather, the Conceivability Argument leads us to the conclusion that
dualism is a better theory for solving the mind-body problem (Balog 1999, 511). Balog argues that it is the dualist nature
that the Conceivability Argument leads to that will work to show the self-refuting nature of the Conceivability Argument.
I intend to prove that the Conceivability Argument is immune from the attacks of Balog. These attacks in turn weaken the
physicalist position, not the dualist position.
The conceivability argument, as presented to us by Jackson, can be illustrated with the following example. A scientist named
Mary is in a room that is entirely black and white. She has no color perception, and is never allowed to see color. In the
room, she is given access to a black and white monitor from which she is able to learn about the world (Jackson 1982, 130).
We are to assume that Mary is able to gather all of the physical information about color, and the mechanisms by which we see
color. The crux of the argument lies in Mary’s experience when she is allowed to leave the room and see color for the
first time. When she becomes exposed to color, and is able to see the rainbow for the first time, we believe that Mary is
gathering new information about the world, namely phenomenal information (Jackson 1982, 130). The physicalist explanation
of the mind-body problem would not allow for us to have this belief, as the physical information that Mary had in the room
would be everything she could possibly know about color. For Jackson, this thought experiment shows that there is an epistemic
gap between the physical description of the world and our phenomenal experience of the world. Because we believe that Mary
experiences something new when she is first exposed to color, Jackson’s conceivability argument proves that physicalism
is wrong in its solution of the mind-body problem.
The heart of Balog’s argument against Jackson is what she refers to as the ‘Zombie Refutation’. She argues
that the Zombie Refutation will work as a reductio argument, proving that Jackson’s Conceivability Argument is self-undermining
(Balog 1999, 512). For the sake of the argument, Balog accepts the idea that a world can exist in which there is no phenomenal
experience. In this world exists a zombie version of Jackson. The zombie Jackson goes about the same type of life as the
real Jackson, giving lectures, and interacting with students and colleagues. This zombie Jackson will, just as the real Jackson
does, have intentional states. Because of this, zombie Jackson can give the same arguments as the real Jackson, word for
word identical, except that words that Jackson uses that refer to phenomenal experiences will for the zombie Jackson instead
refer to something else (Balog 1999, 512). If Jackson’s argument is correct, and the zombie Jackson can give the same
argument, the argument given by the zombie Jackson must therefore also be correct. When Jackson reaches the conclusion that
dualism is true, he is in actuality coming to a conclusion that makes his argument unsound. In the zombie world, to say that
dualism is the correct theory of how the mind and body are situated is impossible (Balog 1999, 513). Because there is no
phenomenal experience in the zombie world, dualism is impossible. For dualism to exist, the mind must be a separate entity
from the body, and hence from the physical world. But, as has been established by the parameters of the argument, in the
zombie world the mind is a part and a function of the physical world. Therefore, Jackson’s Conceivability Argument
can be disregarded on the basis of being self-refuting.
In order to make this reductio argument work, Balog admits that she must make three assumptions. First, Balog assumes that
Jackson and the zombie Jackson share in common all of their intentional states, except for the ones that refer to phenomenal
concepts. Secondly, Balog assumes that the intentional states of Jackson’s that refer to phenomenal concepts will in
the zombie Jackson refer to something physical. Thirdly, Balog assumes that “a prioricity for thoughts supervenes on
the conceptual roles of their constituent (and related) concepts” (Balog 1999, 514). All of these assumptions are necessary
for the reductio to refute Jackson’s argument, and all three assumptions can be objected to for various reasons. Balog
attempts to quell such objections by refuting the most likely objections to these assumptions.
The major objection to the first assumption considered by Balog is that contrary to what she is assuming, the zombie Jackson
will not have intentional states, because the zombie’s lack of phenomenal experience precludes him from having such
intentional states (Balog 1999, 515). In other words, phenomenal experience is necessary for intentional states to exist.
Searle supports this idea, as he proposes that consciousness is a requirement for intentional states to exist (Balog 1999,
515). The zombie, with a lack of phenomenal experience, would not be said to have consciousness, and as such will not be
able to have intentional states. Balog refutes this objection on the basis that, because the zombie Jackson interacts with
both students and colleagues, and is able to answer questions, that intentionality must be present (Baolg 1999, 516).
While Balog believes that this is a sufficient method by which to refute the objection, it is not clear that she has been
successful. The cutting criticism of the objection is not addressed in the refutation. What the objection is pointing out,
that is not being addressed, is an underlying assumption that is not being made by Balog, but not being admitted. When Balog
is making her claims of how the zombie Jackson behaves, and how he interacts with other zombie peoples, she is assuming to
understand the activities of a world that we have no knowledge of. While she proposes one view of how the zombie world is,
with a lack of phenomenal experience, it is important to realize that this proposed world is assumed to conform to the standards
of our world in order to make Jackson’s theory work. While it would be helpful to her explanation for zombie Jackson
to be able to interact with students and answer their questions, it is not certain to what degree the actions of zombie Jackson
will mirror those of the real Jackson in the absence of phenomenal experience. For Balog to make claims about the nature
and behavior of the zombie world is to commit a fallacy as egregious as that she accuses Jackson of committing.
The second assumption made by Balog can be objected to in two ways. Firstly, it can be said that a term such as pain+, which
Balog uses to describe the zombie Jackson’s statements that are parallel to the ones Jackson makes about phenomenal
states, can refer to nonphysical phenomenal pain. In this case, the entire argument being presented by Balog would fall apart,
as she is working with the assumption that no nonphysical states can exist in the zombie world. Secondly, it can be said
that pain+ refers to nothing (Baolg 1999, 516). Balog responds to the second formation of the objection by stating that if
the zombie Jackson, when referring to pain+, is referring to nothing, it would lead to a disastrous conclusion. If pain+
did not refer to anything, the zombie Jackson would be in a position where he is deluded about his knowledge of his mental
life (Balog 1999, 517). The zombie Jackson would believe that he is referring to something by pain+, but actually not be
referring to anything, therefore leaving him unaware of the truth about his cognition. However, if we believe instead that
pain+ refers to statements that are parallel to those of Jackson, we can explain the actions of zombie Jackson. For example,
if zombie Jackson took an aspirin, and we were to ask why he did, he would answer by stating that he had a headache+. This
would be the same as Jackson saying that he took an aspirin because he had a headache (Balog 1999, 519). While the words
are identical, it is obvious to an observer that zombie Jackson is not referring to the same thing as the real Jackson. While
the physical nature of a headache, and a headache+ may be the same, there is an inherent phenomenal experience to be had in
a headache, which will not be available to the zombie Jackson. As such, the zombie Jackson would be uttering empty words
that display no advancement of a physicalist theory.
Leaving aside the first of my criticisms of Balog, her reply to the objections regarding her second assumption are not saved
from the fire of introspection. In the case in which pain+ does not refer to anything, it is unclear as to why this would
result in a problem. The zombie may end up in a position in which he is deluded about his mental life, but we cannot declare
that this is a situation dissimilar to our own. Because we are engaged in a debate such as this, we are unsure as to the
causes of, meanings of, and the function of our phenomenal experiences. It is quite plausible that we are, just as the zombies
are, deluded about the nature of our mental life. Also, even if the zombies were to be deluded about their mental life, a
problem would not necessarily occur. The zombies would not know that they are deluded, and would continue their lives under
the assumption that they are genuinely referring to something by pain+. Their zombie lives would continue as normal, whether
they are referring to anything by pain+ or not. In the second case, in which pain+ refers to something parallel to Jackson’s
phenomenal experience, the answers we are given are puzzling. In the example given by Balog, if zombie Jackson explains his
taking of an aspirin by stating that he has a headache+, we are in a position in which we desire a deeper explanation. While
such an explanation is one that the real Jackson is likely to give, we would require something more from the zombie Jackson.
A headache is a phenomenal experience for the real Jackson, and the experience of a headache+ would have to be something physical
in the zombie world, therefore it is not clear how the zombie’s reasoning for taking an aspirin is derived. The physical
impetus of a headache in the real Jackson is not enough to cause him to take an aspirin. It is only when he experiences the
phenomenon of pain that he desires to relieve the pain by means of drug. Zombie Jackson would not be privy to this phenomenal
experience of pain, so taking an aspirin for the sole reason of the physical impetus seems to be incomplete as an explanation
of his actions. In a purely physical sense, in which there is no phenomenal experience, there would be no reason for zombie
Jackson to ever take an aspirin for a reason other than the prevention of heart disease, since the goal of aspirin is to relieve
a phenomenal experience. Balog is less than clear about how the zombie Jackson’s language of pain+ or headache+ is
relatable to something such as aspirin, which only serves a function with regards to a phenomenal experience.
Balog’s attempt to refute Jackson’s Conceivability Argument is noble, and may in fact be possible, but the manner
in which she attempts to do so is not successful. Throughout her argument, assumptions and inconsistencies exist that work
against her point. Beyond the assumption that we can speak authoritatively about the zombie world, Balog seems determined
to equate phenomenal experience with physical descriptions without providing a sufficient link between the two. To do so
is, as she claims Jackson’s argument to be, self-defeating. Balog, in her attempt to refute Jackson, only serves to
show the weakness in the argument for physicalism, not the weakness in the Conceivability Argument against physicalism.
Works Cited
Balog, Katalin. “Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem.” The Philosophical Review. Vol 108,
No 4. (Oct., 1999), pp. 497-528.
Jackson, Frank. “Epiphenomenal Qualia.” The Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 32, No 127. (Apr., 1982), pp. 127-136.
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