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Ethical Program Theory
Abstract: In this paper I will provide a new theory as to the origin of ethics and moral thinking in human society. Rather
than basing ethics on the omnipresence of a deity, or on the faculties of reason, I will instead propose that ethics as an
entity is based upon the process of evolution. The similarity of ethics to biological phenomena can be shown by reference
to emotion. Ethical presuppositions contain a similar structure to emotions, and theories as to the root causes of and nature
of emotions will shed light on the nature of ethics. By appealing to the affect program theory, as presented and defended
by Craig Delancey, I will show that ethics as we know it can be addressed as a biological condition, and not merely as a series
of arbitrary decisions based on religion or reason. This theory, which will be called the Ethical Program Theory, will maintain
that our ethics are a function of our emotions, are biological, and that our current debate between absolutists and relativists
is inconsequential and unnecessary.
Ethical Program Theory:
Introduction:
Philosophy is not a stand-alone subject. The rational thinking implored by the philosopher is not a sufficient tool to conjure
and prove theories regarding all manner of subjects. The expertise, and the revolutionary theories of pioneers in other areas
of both the natural and social sciences can be, and should be, used by the philosopher to form a better understanding of the
world we come in contact with. Any need for validation of this point need not look any further than our current study of
ethics. For the better part of a millennium, the best thinkers have tried to wrap their minds around the subtleties of moral
thinking around the world, trying to create a theory for the formation and propagation of ethics as we know it. This approach
has given rise to countless theories, none of which have been viewed as satisfactory by a large enough fraction of the population
at large to be classified as a sufficient explanation of moral thinking. What is needed is not further refinement of the
current theories, but a rerouting of ethical studies. In the quest to find the normative basis for our entire moral thinking,
attention must be paid to the advancements in biology and cognitive science. By utilizing theories in both of these disciplines,
we can formulate a theory of ethics that is more defensible, and allows both ethical absolutists and relativists to claim
victory in the debate within meta-ethics.
Affect Program Theory:
The philosophy of mind has made great strides in the past century in the effort to describe and detail the process of emotional
formation within our minds. By drawing heavily on research from the various aspects of cognitive science, several legitimate
theories have been developed that outline the ways in which our emotions are formed. Of these theories, the Affect Program
Theory stands out as being unique. The Affect Program Theory is the only theory within the philosophy of mind that uses scientific
evidence to show a basis for emotion that is not purely cognitive. This point is an important one to make, as biologists,
geneticists especially, are fond to point out that everything related to humans and human activity is both ‘nature and
nurture’ (Nature and nurture are used as generic terms relating to the broad scope of the argument regarding human activity.
Nature stands for the genetic makeup of an individual as it produces an action, and nurture refers to the environmental conditions
that an individual is raised in as it produces an action.). Yet, knowing that all human activity is largely believed to have
a strong biological basis, and knowing that the actions of thinking have a biological basis (the firing of neurons), it appears
odd to us that the major theories of the philosophy of mind have failed to take biology into account when describing the nature
of emotions.
The Affect Program Theory aims to fix this oversight by traditional philosophers of mind. The Affect Program Theory can
be stated simply in the following manner: “The Affect Program Theory is the view that some emotions are pancultural
syndromes enabled by inherited biological capabilities” (Delancey 2002, 3). The Affect Program Theory, when stated
in this manner, is making the claim that our emotions are not fictions of our mind, but biological functions that we inherit
in much the same way we do our genome. Each affect (A term that I will consider to be synonymous with emotion, for convenience.)
is a conglomeration of “physiological responses, stereotypical actions, and perhaps even normal cognitive roles”
(Delancey 2002, 23). The affect can contain our traditional notions of emotions, which consist mainly of cognition, be it
conscious or not, as well as additional physical phenomena. The addition of physical phenomena to the equation gives us a
new question to answer: in what way are the physical phenomena that are associated with our emotions developed in each individual?
If we work within the Affect Program Theory, the development of physical phenomena is equally important as, if not more important
than, the cognitive role that is played in the development of emotions. The physical phenomena that we come to associate with
a particular emotion appear to be pancultural, which deepens our interest in the biological nature of emotions.
The Pancultural Nature of Emotions:
The physical phenomena that are associated with an emotion appear to be pancultural. Neuroscientist Jaak Panksepp,
advocates a psychobiological theory of some emotions in which they arise from neural circuits and enable adaptive behaviors;
these neural circuits “are genetically hard-wired and designed to respond to respond unconditionally to stimuli arising
from major life-challenging circumstances” and they “organize behavior by activating or inhibiting classes of
related actions… that have proved adaptive in the fact of those types of life-challenging circumstances during the evolutionary
history of the species” (Delancey 2002, 25-26).
The claim made by Panksepp is one that places emotions firmly in the camp of an inherited biological function, one that is
inherited from generation to generation. Fortunately, his theory has evidence to support the biological and inheritable nature
of emotions.
From psychological and cognitive science studies, a wealth of information has been amassed to show a biological inheritability
of emotion. Whether or not the entire emotion being dealt with is inherited through biological means is not the question
at hand. To claim that the entire experience of an emotion, the various forms that the emotion can take, and the ability
to properly project the emotion onto an object is to advocate an absurdity. As is the case with any biological function controlled
by heredity, the environment, in this case learning, plays an equally large role in the proper development of the function.
Let me be clear that when I make the claim that emotions are inherited, I am referring only to the broadest sense of the term
emotion. I mean only that the crude and simple cases of an emotion, as in the ability to feel sad, are inherited. The ability
to properly utilize the emotion, and to understand the nuances of the emotion cannot be inherited. These aspects must be
acquired through learning and experience.
With the meaning of inheritance now clear, the evidence for the biological basis and inheritability of emotions can be examined.
One of the clearest examples of how biology plays a key role in emotion is the case of EVR. EVR is a normally functioning
subject, with the exception of his lack of a prefrontal cortex in his brain. EVR “has an IQ of 135, and passes all
the usual neuropsychological tests like a normal” (Delancey 2002, 39).
In one experiment, EVR was shown pictures of disturbing and provocative scenes. These pictures cause in normals a skin conductance
response – a clear measure of the autonomic signs of affect. But EVR showed no significant response – he literally
flatlined on his polygraph when he merely looked at the pictures and was not asked to describe them. The subject even reported
after the test that he had noticed that he did not have the kind of feeling that he thought he ought to have for some of the
pictures. He has the cognitive ability to recognize and describe the phenomena, but he does not have the appropriate emotional
responses to them (Delancey 2002, 39).
What the case of EVR illustrates for us is that cognition alone is not sufficient for emotions to arise. The prefrontal cortex
of the brain, the EVR case shows us conclusively, plays an active role in the development of some emotions. Despite knowing
that he should be feeling some emotion when viewing the pictures, the lack of emotion in EVR proves that the biological mechanisms
present within the prefrontal cortex are necessary for emotion to occur. The prefrontal cortex, necessary for emotion, is
a biological function that is inherited throughout generations and developed through the process of evolution, and from this
it can be shown that emotions rely on biology and inheritance to survive.
EVR is not the only way in which we can prove that emotions are biological in their manifestations. If we consider the case
of direct neural stimulation, it again becomes increasingly clear that our emotions have a strong biological connection.
“Direct electrical stimulation of particular subcortical areas of the brain can yield affective states in humans and
nonhuman animals…Also, brain damage can result in spontaneous and excessive affect…It has long been known that
lesions in parts of the hypothalamus can cause rage in human and nonhuman animals” (Delancey 2002, 39). Again, it is
clear from this evidence that the biology of the brain is a major factor in the development and expression of emotions in
humans.
Yet another case from which we can see the biological impact on emotions is in infants. Infants have not yet developed the
cognitive power to have emotions that are purely cognitive; still they show various basic emotions. “An infant can
show some of the facial expressions of emotions, and after only a few weeks exhibits many of the behavioral features of emotions
– signs of anger at being frustrated, or fear when confronted with strange stimuli, or pleasure when they see a mother’s
face” (Delancey 2002, 41). This case is especially important, as the mental development of an infant is such that the
only way that they would be able to properly form and express an emotion would be if the emotion were biologically programmed
in their brains. The cognitive power of an infant is far from developed enough to allow the complex thought patterns required
to calculate fear through purely cognitive lines, leaving a preprogrammed biological nature of emotion as the viable alternative.
So far, all of the proof being offered only illustrates that emotions are biological. The proofs thus far offered have not
done much to show the impact of evolution on emotions. If we consider emotions to be biological in the sense that I have
outlined, it would follow that through evolution, emotions would be found in other species that are closely related to humans.
When we look upon the animal world, we can clearly see some evidence of emotions. While lower animals cannot be said to have
any emotions, we can posit fear or pleasure in animals such as cats and dogs.
It seems clear that some nonhuman animals emote and do not have the same kinds of content that we do when we have what is
purportedly the same kind of emotion. Since the state of the ‘fearing’ cat can share many of the physiological
and behavioral features that our own emotions do, we are again confronted with the question of why we would take the cognitive
aspects of the emotion as more important than these other features. Taking evolution seriously suggests that the other features
should be primary, such as the kinds of behavior responses (in this case, flight) shared by these animals (Delancey 2002,
41).
What this line of evidence shows us that the others do not is that emotions are not only found in nonhuman animals, but are
remarkably similar to the emotions in humans. The similarity of emotional responses in humans and nonhuman animals, given
the differences in cognitive power between humans and nonhuman animals, shows that emotions must be biologically based. In
much the same way that physically homologous structures arise from evolution, it can be concluded from this evidence that
evolution has also led to the homology of emotions in the various species of higher animals.
Ethics in the Mold of our Emotions:
All of this talk about emotions and their development is important to the study of philosophy of mind, but what does it have
to do with the study of ethics? It would seem that the two studies are inherently different, and would not lend themselves
to be melded into a consistent theory. But, the different disciplines of philosophy are not mutually exclusive. The best
theories that we can gain in any discipline of philosophy arise from the integration of information from all disciplines of
philosophy, as well as the integration of information from disciplines outside of philosophy. The development of emotions
that has been presented already holds great relevance to ethics. When we examine ethical judgments, we see that they are
not fully rational judgments derived from pure logic. In many instances, our ethical judgments are biased by, if not totally
formed on the basis of, our emotions.
In the broadest of senses, we can boil ethics down into the following proposition: we aim to choose actions that are ‘right’,
and avoid actions that are ‘wrong’. Our assessment of which actions that are possible alternatives are ‘right’
falls squarely on our emotions, even in a system of rigorous logic. Utilitarianism, in all its various forms, is the most
logic-based form of ethics that is widely maintained by scholars. By turning the designation of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’
actions into an algorithm involving the pleasures and pains produced by an action, it would seem to create the ideal system;
a system in which any rational being should be able to come to a similar, if not the same, conclusion. As such, the idea
that our ethical judgments are based on our emotions would appear to be an absurd claim. Yet, as will be proven, the claim
that our ethical judgments are based on our emotions is a wholly acceptable, and preferable, claim to accept.
For our ethical judgments to be based on our emotions, two criteria must be met; a link between emotion and ethical judgments
must be demonstrated, and ethical judgments must be shown to have similar characteristics to our emotions. Both of these
criteria will be easily demonstrated.
The Link Between Ethics and Emotion:
The idea that many of our ethical judgments are based on our emotions is not a radical claim to make. By using a few examples,
it will become clear how our emotions influence our ethical judgments (For the purposes of the examples and the relating discussion,
I would like to address the actions of only those people that would qualify as ‘normal’. A person with a cognitive
disorder, such as a psychopath, would not calculate her actions in the manner deemed appropriate, and as such would not be
useful to these examples. It may be further noted that people with a cognitive disorder have a biological difference to ‘normal’
people, be it a structural or neurochemical difference, which would account for the differences in ethical judgments between
those with the cognitive disorder and those we call ‘normal’. I will not address the issue of whether our term,
‘normal’, refers to an actual subset of the population at large, or whether it is a fictional creation.)
A popular example to use when asking questions about basic ethical principles is that which can be named “The Fat Man
Dilemma”. In this case, we imagine that we are traveling in a tour group, exploring a series of caves near the ocean.
While inside one of the caves, the tide begins to rise, and an overweight member of the group blocks the only opening to the
cave. The tide will rise and drown the group if the opening is not cleared, and the only means by which the opening can be
cleared is by using the group’s oddly present stick of dynamite, killing the overweight person who is the blockage.
There are two options for the group; kill the overweight person and save the lives of the others in the group, or maintain
the dignity of the overweight person’s life and let the group die. While a utilitarian would measure the benefits to
both of the options in terms of the pleasures and pains produced, both available options are based on our emotions. If the
group chooses to kill the overweight person, they are doing so out of fear; fear that they will die. If the group chooses
not to kill the overweight person, they are doing so out of a combination of respect and disgust; they are disgusted by the
idea of killing another person, and they also respect the value of life enough to decide that they are not willing to make
one life suffer for the purposes of another. It can be debated if respect is an emotion, but for the purposes of the debate,
we will assume that respect is a combination of envy and love, thus making respect into a complex emotion (The merits of this
analogy can be debated, but the accuracy of the analogy does not substantially affect the success of the conclusions being
drawn). What we learn by looking at this example is that no matter how logical a utilitarian may want to look at the situation,
both alternatives that can be chosen from are affected by emotions.
To take another example, we will consider a case presented by Carritt.
“[If] some kind of very cruel crime becomes common, and none of the criminals can be caught, it might be expedient,
as an example, to hang an innocent man, if a charge against him could be so framed that he were universally thought guilty”
(Carritt 1947, 65). As is the case with the previous example, two options exist that have different moral considerations.
Much like the previous case, both of the options, while being opposed to one another, are propagated on our emotions. Considering
the first option available, to condemn an innocent man to death to stop the wave of crime, it is easy to see how emotions
come into play. The fear of further crime, and of being a victim, moves to the forefront of people’s consciousness,
and causes the people to take any action necessary to avoid that which they are afraid of. Considering the second option
available, to do nothing and allow the crimes to continue, the decision is still based on emotions. Rather than fear, this
option is predicated on disgust for what is essentially the murder of an innocent man.
Both of the cases outlined deal with the emotions of fear and disgust, but similar cases can be drawn that rely on jealousy
(stealing a desired object that a rival has possession of), happiness (keeping a wallet containing money that was found on
the street), anger (attacking and killing a rival due to an action that angered the agent), and sadness (suicide). To outline
an example of each emotion determining an ethical judgment would be redundant, and as such, has not been undertaken in this
paper.
The Structure of Ethics and Emotion:
Having shown that ethical judgments are made with respect to our emotions, it must now be shown that our emotions are structures
in a similar way as our ethics. Since I have already made the claim that emotions are biological and inheritable, I must
now prove that ethics functions in the same way. The definitive proof that emotions are biological syndromes of our mind
has yet to be addressed in this paper. In this section, I will show the best proof for the biological basis of emotions,
and then show how ethics follows a similar pattern, thus proving that ethics and emotions are both biological syndromes.
Given the genetic similarity between all of the humans on the earth, it would seem that if emotions were biological, emotions
would exist panculturally, following similar patterns of manifestation throughout the varying cultures of the world. If emotions
were not found in this manner, if they in turn are subject to the culture in which they are found, the entire prospect of
biological emotions would fall apart. Fortunately, evidence exists that proves the pancultural nature of emotions as they
are manifested throughout the various cultures of the world.
To illustrate the pancultural nature of emotions, I will turn to a passage from Craig Delancey.
Some of the most compelling evidence for pancultural human emotions has come from studies of facial expression” (Delancey
2002, 18). “Cross-cultural studies of facial expressions have found evidence of high cross-cultural correlations.
These kinds of studies were made in a thorough manner by Ekman and colleagues (Ekman, Sorenson, and Friensen 1969), who sought
to get as pure a cross-cultural study as was possible. They created a set of thirty photographs of facial expressions that
they felt expressed six emotions that other psychologists had proposed as basic (happiness, surprise, fear, anger, disgust,
and sadness). They then showed the photographs to college students in the United States, Brazil, Japan, and to volunteers
in New Guinea and Borneo. The six emotion terms were translated into the appropriate languages and then the subjects were
asked to group the pictures under the terms. A very significant degree of agreement was usually found – higher for
some emotions than others, and for some cultures than for others, but in general there was an unmistakably significant degree
of agreement. Ekman and Friesen re-created this experiment (1971) working with the Fore of New Guinea, a cultural group relatively
isolated from the rest of the world, and found agreements again ranging from 64 percent (for fear) to 92 percent (for happiness).
This work and related work (Izard 1971) support the view that human facial expression of some emotions is pancultural (Delancey
2002, 18-19).
What is learned from these experiments that were conducted is that our emotional responses are strikingly similar between
cultures, more than would be predicted without a biological basis for our emotions.
What must be done now is prove that our ethical judgments follow a similar line to our emotions. If it can be shown that
our basic ethical judgments and feelings are pancultural in a similar manner, it can be shown that a biological basis for
our ethics is likely. To accomplish this feat, I will show that several actions that appear in remote cultures, which appear
on the surface to be applicable only to one specific culture, are in reality nothing more than different takes on the same
moral guideline.
Ruth Benedict provides us with an account of an action that on the surface appears to only be applicable to one specific culture.
The Kwakiutl tribe approves of murder in a sense that typical Western values would not accept. “Among the Kwakiutl
it did not matter whether a relative had died in bed of disease, or by the hand of an enemy, in either case death was an affront
to be wiped out by the death of another person” (Benedict 1934, 71). They believe that when faced with death, the appropriate
response is to “thrust back in return” (Benedict 1934, 71). An action of this type defies any Western notion
of proper behavior. The tradition line of thinking is that ‘murder is wrong in all instances’. It is important
to phrase the proposition in such a manner. To say that murder is wrong is not to say that killing is wrong. This distinction
is important to maintain, as they Kwakiutl are not committing murder. As they see the situation, the personification of death
has struck a blow upon them, and killing an outsider is the only method with which they may retaliate. The action of killing
the outsider stops the process of death for the time being. The actions of the Kwakiutl can be seen to be in the same spirit
as those of typical Americans who attack, and sometimes kill, intruders who make threats upon their lives. The only difference
to be drawn in the case of the Kwakiutl is the target of the retribution. However, the target does not matter when discussing
the ethical nature of the action. The fact remains that, whatever target may be chosen, the roots of the action of the Kwakiutl
are similar to those of a typical American.
Every society has a prescription for the proper way in which to treat the dead. In the Western world, the appropriate methods
consist mainly of burial and cremation. It would be safe in assuming that virtually all members of the Western world agree
on the proposition that cannibalism of the dead is an action that should be classified as ‘wrong’. Yet, there
exist tribes of peoples in the outlaying parts of the world that do not follow this line of thinking. The eating of the brain
of a dead relative is said to allow that person to gain the deceased’s strength and power. Surely, in this case it
cannot be so that the roots of the cannibalization are the same as the Westerners who bury their dead. But, just such a claim
may be made. The roots of the cannibalization in these remote cultures arise from the same ethical groundwork as does the
Western notion of burial; respecting the dead. By burying the dead, Westerners think that we are preserving the bodies of
the dead for whatever sort of afterlife is believed in. Beyond that, the act of burial is entrenched in the respect for the
dead, and the disturbing nature of somehow desecrating the body of the deceased. The cannibalization arises from this same
basic notion. These cultures that engage in the action of cannibalizing the dead are doing so out of intense respect for
their deceased.
A strikingly similar parallel can be drawn with a culture which, when the elders of the society reach an appropriate age,
send the elders off into the wilderness to be eaten by the bears. This would again seem to be a case that is wholly opposed
to the traditional Western notion of appropriate conduct. However, as is in the case of the cannibalization, this action
is performed out of respect; respect for the parents and elders of the society. Rather than see their parents grow to an
old age in which they are feeble and unable to function as they used to, the parents are sent to die. By sentencing their
parents to death, the society is actually showing an ultimate form of respect. In this society, the dead enter the afterlife
in the physical form they were in when they died. Having their parents die before they can physically deteriorate ensures
that the parents will have the best chance at having a positive afterlife. Thus, respect is paid for the parents in what
could be classified otherwise as an unethical action.
It must be addressed, however, that the ethical propositions being discussed in this section can be doubted to be universal.
It is true that it can be doubted to what extent ‘murder is wrong’, or ‘respect for the dead’ is a
universal ethical judgment, but this can be readily solved. While the judgments being used in the examples may or may not
be universal, they can be simplified to an extent in which their universality cannot be questioned. Fear and respect are
complex emotions in their responsive nature, and a simplification of these emotions will show their universality. By breaking
the prepositional emotions ‘fear’ and ‘respect’ into the simpler prepositional emotions ‘like’
and ‘dislike’, we can see a universality that may have been doubted in the more complex example. The earlier
claims may be simplified into the claims, “I help those that I like”, and “I hurt those I don’t like”.
These simplified claims allow for a different perspective on the situation. The simplified propositions are simplified to
a degree that, when we look at nature, we see examples of them being true across species. In an observation of virtually
any species of animals, altruism is present between members of familial units, and animosity is present when outsiders threaten
the familial unit. These actions fall under the propositions that have been outlined as our basis for ethics, thus it is
shown that a biological basis indeed exists for these propositions, and the universality of the propositions may not be doubted.
It can be seen from the examples presented that ethical actions that differ from society are not so radically different as
to render ethics relative. Rather, while the actions themselves are radically different from culture to culture, the ethical
presuppositions that give rise to the actions are strikingly similar panculturally. This evidence provides us with proof
that the basis of our ethics is pancultural in a similar manner to the basis of our emotions, and given the biological nature
of our emotions, it follows that it is equally justifiable to claim that our ethics have a biological and inheritable foundation.
It is important to note that what is being argued is that our moral decisions are based upon our emotions, and it is the emotional
response of the agent that determines the moral worth of an action. While a typical Westerner and a member of the Kwakiutl
will have varying opinion about what is the correct way to respond to the death of a loved one, so long as both are working
from the same emotional response, their actions will be viewed in a more favorable light than those of an agent that acts
from an inappropriate emotional response. The emotion is manifested in different ways, but the basic emotion remains the
same. It is the emotion at the heart of the moral decision that is the basis on which we draw our distinctions of moral worth.
Ethical Program Theory and the Traditional Debate:
Having shown that our emotions have a biological basis, I wish to consider what the Ethical Program Theory may contribute
to the traditional debate in ethics; the absolutist/relativist debate with regard to the existence of universal ethical guidelines.
The Ethical Program Theory appears, if one does not delve into the minutia, to be an absolutist theory of ethics. By showing
that our ethics have a biological basis, we are laying the groundwork for absolutist theory to arise. A biological system
brings with it a sense of inevitability. Surely, if our ethics were a biological system, the idea that there can be more than
one acceptable norm would be as ridiculous as stating that more than one form of DNA exists. However, the inevitability of
an absolutist theory of ethics that is based upon the Ethical Program Theory is only the creation of an absolutist’s
will. The Ethical Program Theory does not endorse either absolutism or relativism wholly; rather it blends the two together
to form a more comprehensive theory of ethics that can be accepted by both relativists and absolutists.
The comparison I made between ethics and DNA is apt. When we consider DNA, it is obvious that there is only one form available
for DNA to take. All DNA is composed of the same nitrogenous bases and sugars, and all DNA bonds in the same manner to form
a double helix. But, the form of DNA does not entail the manner in which it is displayed. The differing pairing of the bases
in the DNA helix produces different genes that produce different affects in the organisms being studied. Working from the
same chemical and physical basis, we reach different results.
In much the same way, the Ethical Program Theory follows this line. The biological basis of our ethics is merely a lattice
upon which we graft our particular moral judgments. While the basic and underlying tenets of ethics, such that ‘murder
is wrong’, are universal and pancultural, the manner in which these tenets are manifested in our judgments will vary
wildly. As was shown through the examples of cannibalization and retaliatory killing, the particular action that was chosen
to be ‘right’ will vary from group to group, but the reasoning for the action is strikingly similar across cultural
lines.
What does this sense of ethics mean for the debate between absolutists and relativists? In a sense, if one were to broadly
draw conclusions from the evidence presented, it could be said that the Ethical Program Theory renders the debate pointless.
Both the absolutist and the relativist would be correct in their positions, but they would not realize that they are merely
arguing two aspects of the same position. The narrow focus and stubborn clinging that are associated with maintaining a viewpoint
would lead to an inability to see the broad picture. To draw an analogy, the absolutist and the relativist see each other
as if they are arguing from the North and South Poles, not realizing that they are indeed on the same planet. The nature
of ethics is not clear cut enough to be able to say definitively that either there is a certain code that contains the proper
conduct in every situation (and identifying what those actions are), or that no action has any more worth than any other.
Both of those positions would strike a common sense observer to be absurd. Putting aside philosophical discussion, it strikes
the average person that we have not yet come to a consensus on the proper code of action (which leads us to think that there
cannot be an absolute code; if there were it would reason that it would be easy for us to figure out the right actions), just
as it strikes the average person that not all actions have the same moral worth. There are some actions that virtually everyone,
barring the misguided relativists who cannot see the world clearly, that are more ‘right’ than others.
The benefit of the Ethical Program Theory is the melding of the absolutist and relativist theories into one comprehensive
theory. From the basis of the Ethical Program Theory, we can maintain that the absolutist notion of a certain set of actions
that exist as ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ independent of our actions is true, while still being able to account
for and accepting the disparity in the actions of people in various cultures. What this does is allow us to move the debate
from an issue of whether or not ethics exists independent of culture to an issue of whether or not a specific action is an
appropriate application of the prescriptive moral qualities that we all have inherent within us. This shift may allow ethics
to make a large stride towards developing a more uniform code of conduct for all people, and may allow ethics to move closer
to its ultimate goal.
Conclusion:
The Ethical Program Theory provides us with a basis upon which we may build a more sound theory of which particular actions
that are present within cultures around the world are acceptable. By maintaining a biological basis for our ethics, we are
removing the seeds of doubt that creep into any ethical judgment that we make. The skepticism of intense relativism is lifted,
as is the constraint of an intense absolutism. In place of the predominant theories of years gone by is a new theory that
allows us to make progress in the search for an ethical code for everyone, and a theory that allows us to end the two-pronged
debate between the absolutists and relativists that has co-opted far too much of the collective interest of philosophy. For
the nature of ethics is not a black and white dichotomy of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. Ethics is more akin
to a mobius strip; a system that allows for great divergence while still existing on the same plane. The Ethical Program
Theory allows ethics to exist in this manner.
References:
Carritt, E.F . Ethical and Practical Thinking. (Oxford, 1947)
Delancey, Craig. Passionate Engines. Oxford University Press. 2002.
Benedict, Ruth. Anthropology and the Abnormal. Journal of General Psychology 10 (1934) 59-82
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